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GENE R. SHREVE
Judgments From a Choice-of-Law Perspective
Case developments in the judgments area most likely to interest
the conflicts community concern the preclusive effect of state judg-
ments in sister-state and federal coruts. They involve questions
whether a state court may give greater force to a sister-state judg-
ment than it would have where rendered, and whether state pro-
ceedings have preclusive weight in certain federal cases. Before
examining developments, some background might be useful.
Just as laws from different jurisdictions may conflict on points
of tort or contract, so may they conflict on points within the law of
judgments. For example, state jurisdictions are divided on whether
to permit nonmutual issue preclusion, and on whether claim preclu-
sion should prevent successive lawsuits for property damage and
personal injury claims arising out of the same accident (claim split-
ting). In one important respect, however, the dynamics of decision
regarding judgments differ from those for choice-of-law generally.
Far more often, federal law denies courts the authority to choose be-
tween conflicting preclusion laws. The following situations illus-
trate this difference.
First consider a choice-of-law setting uncomplicated by a prior
adjudication. A state judge's choice between, say, the tort law of her
own state and that of a sister state will often be unrestrained by fed-
eral law.1 The judge is thus free to honor an affirmative defense
drawn from her own state's law to limit the ability of a local manu-
facturer. But change the situation to one involving a conflict of pre-
clusion rules and the judge often loses flexibility. In this setting,
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1. Federal constitutional and statutory law is unlikely to restrain our judge
here, so long as neither choice imposes unfair surprise and both states bear the mini-
mal relationship to the parties and controversy necessary to make them interested in
having their laws applied. See Weinberg, "Choice of Law and Minimal Scrutiny," 49
U. Chi. L. Rev. 440 (1982); Shreve, "Interest Analysis as Constitutional Law," 48 Ohio
St. L.J. 51 (1987). Whether state courts should or will retain so much autonomy in
the future has become a popular subject for speculation. E.g., Laycock, "Equal Citi-
zens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of
Law," 92 Colum. L. Rev. 249 (1992); Trautman, "Toward Federalizing Choice of
Law," 70 Tex. L. Rev. 1715 (1992); Shreve, "Conflicts Law-State or Federal?," 68
Ind L. J. - (1993) (forthcoming).
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federal full faith and credit law2 has long been read to require states
to give as much force to sister-state judgments as they would have
where rendered.3
An example would be where plaintiff sues in State Y for per-
sonal injury, and defendant bases an affirmative defense of claim
preclusion on a prior judgment from State X. Assume that plain-
tiff's suit against defendant in State X arose from the same accident,
but was for property damage only. Assume further that State Y law
permits plaintiff to split property and personal injury claims into
two lawsuits, but the claim preclusion law of State X blocks the sec-
ond suit. The force of federal full faith and credit law is such that,
even if plaintiff is a citizen of State Y (or for some other reason the
forum has an interest in providing the plaintiff with an opportunity
to litigate the personal injury claim), a Y state court may not aid
plaintiff through local preclusion law. The rule is that State Y must
be as aggressive in enforcing a judgment of State X as a court of
State X would be.
The converse of this situation raises a differnt and less settled
question: whether a state court may give a sister-state judgment
greater preclusive effect than it would have where rendered. For
example, if a state court would use one of its own judgments to bar a
successive action for personal injury, may it do the same with a judg-
ment from a sister state that permits successive actions? Or may a
court give the nonmutual, issue-preclusive effect customary under
local law to a judgment from a state still adhering to the mutuality
doctrine?4
Jurisdictions (a large majority) that have enhanced the effect of
their own judgments by abolishing the mutuality doctrine (or by
barring claim splitting) clearly have an interest in applying their
own perclusion doctrine even to judgments originating in other
states. The stimulus for such greater preclusion is in part to con-
serve the forum's judicial resources. - Wherever the source of the
judgment, litigation permitted in the forum through relaxation of lo-
cal preclusion doctrine dissipates those resources.
Yet federal law arguably limits the power of state judges to
favor more preclusive local doctrine when enforcing a sister-state
2. U.S. Const. art. IV, sec. 1 (Full Faith and Credit Clause); 28 U.S.C. sec. 1738
(Full Faith and Credit Statute). Since both bear upon state litigation, and in about
the same way, the two provisions usually can be collapsed into "the full faith and
credit requirement." Casad, "Intersystem Issue Preclusion and the Restatement
(Second) of Judgments," 66 Cornell L. Ret. 510, 520 (1981).
3. See, e.g., Underwriters Nat'l Assurance Co. v. North Carolina Life & Acci-
dent & Health Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 455 U.S. 691 (1982).
4. The reasoning of the mutuality doctrine is that, because strangers to the
original action ran no risk of being bound by it, they cannot use it to bind original
parties. Nonmutual issue preclusion rejects the mutuality doctrine. See generaly G.
Shreve & P. Raven-Hansen, Understanding Civil Procedure sec. 113[B] (1989).
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judgment. It has been suggested that, in some cases at least, the ap-
plication of preclusion law different from that where judgment was
rendered might subject one of the original parties to prejudicial
suprise in violation of due process.5 Of broader application may be
the suggestion that the obligation on states under federal full faith
and credit law is not merely to give as much preclusive effect to sis-
ter-state judgments as they would have where rendered but to give
as much and no more.
The greater-preclusion question has attracted attention within
the legal academy,6 but it has not arisen in many reported cases.
The leading decisions for the proposition that the enforcement fo-
rum can substitute its own more expansive preclusion doctrine are
Finley v. Kesling7 and Hart v. American Airlines.8 An Illinois ap-
pellate court in Finley used Illinois doctrine to enlarge the preclu-
sive effect of an Indiana judgment. (Illinois permitted nonmutual
issue preclusion, while Indian adhered to the mutuality doctrine.)
Federal full faith and credit law did not require greater preclusive
effect under local doctrine, reasoned Finley, but it did not prevent it
either. Treating a Texas federal diversity judgment as the
equivalent of one from a Texas state court, Hart observed: "the
state of Texas has no legitimate interest in imposing its rules on col-
lateral estoppel upon these New York residents . . . ." Finley and
Hart both stressed the importance to the forum of benefits secured
through abolition of the mutuality doctrine. Neither court was will-
ing to sacrifice them by deferring to the preclusion law of the place
where judgment was rendered.
Recently, however, state decisions in Delaware and New York
have moved in the opposite direction. In Columbia Casualty Co. v.
Playtex, Inc.,10 and in Harvey v. Amateur Hockey Ass'n of the
United States," courts refused to augment by local doctrine the
preclusive effect of judgments rendered elsewhere. Columbia is sig-
nificant because the Delaware Supreme Court flatly rejected the
premise upon which Finley rests.12 Harvey did not refer to full-
5. E.g., Atwood, "State Court Judgments in Federal Litigation: Mapping the
Contours of Full Faith and Credit," 58 Ind. L.J. 59, 70 (1982).
6. E.g., D. Vernon, W. Weinberg, W. Reynolds, & W. Richman, Conflict of
Laws: Materials and Problems 587-592 (1990).
7. 433 N.E.2d 1112 (Ill. App. 1982).
8. 304 N.Y.S.2d 810 (App. Special Term 1969).
9. 304 N.Y.S.2d at 813.
10. 584 A.2d 1214 (Del. Supr. Ct. 1991).
11. 567 N.Y.2d 44 (A. D. 1 Dept. 1991).
12. To the extent ... that the mutuality requirement may be viewed as hav-
ing its origin in Kansas decisional law, the interpretation of the full faith
and credit clause advanced by Columbia would result in Delaware giving
the judgments of a sister state greater preclusive effect than they would
have in the rendering jurisdiction. * * * This result is clearly at variance
with the purpose and spirit of the full faith and credit clause.
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faith-and-credit law; yet, in applying Michigan law to limit the
preclusive effect of a Michigan judgment, Harvey may have under-
cut Hart (another intermediate New York appellate decision).
Whatever doubts still attend the issue in state court, it now
seems the federal judges may not give greater preclusive effect to
state judgments than they would have where rendered. 13 But, if the
compulsion on federal judges to honor state judgments is stronger in
this respect, it is potentially weaker in another. Congressional
power to relax a state's duty to honor sister-state judgments may be
limited because that duty rests in part on the Full Faith and Credit
Clause of the Constitution. In contrast, the Constitution'places little
if any obligation on federal courts to honor state judgments. In
given situations, then, Congress can use its authority to shield fed-
eral litigation from the preclusive effect of state proceedings-by
suspending the Federal Full Faith and Credit Statute (section
1738), 14 and by preemptuing authority the federal judiciary might
otherwise use to give state determinations preclusive effect under
federal doctrine. 15
This is why inquiries about the preclusive effect of state pro-
ceedings on subsequent federal litigation are dominated by specific
examinations of statutory text and legislative history. Two recent
Supreme Court decisions offer examples. In Astoria Federal Sav-
ings v. Solimino,16 the Court held that a state administrative finding
Columbia, 584 A.2d at 1218.
13. Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 383,
386 (1985); Parsons Steel v. First Alabama Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 525 (1986). Both deci-
sions base this duty on the Federal Full Faith and Credit Statute, 28 U.S.C. 1738.
For extended discussion of Marreose and the greater-preclusion question in general,
see Shreve, "Preclusion and Federal Choice of Law," 64 Tex. L. Rev. 1209 (1986).
Since state judges too are subject to this statute, Marrese and Parsons Steel raise
some doubt about the continuing authority of Finley and Hart. However, the
Supreme Court has not settled the matter. L. Teply & R. Whitten, Civil Procedure
705 (1991).
14. An example frequently cited is federal district court relief under the habeas
corpus statute. Currie, "Res Judicata: The Neglected Defense," 45 U. Chi. L. Ref.
317, 330, 333 (1978); P. Bator, D. Meltzer, P. Mishkin, & D. Shapiro, The Federal
Courts and the Federal System 1487 (3rd ed. 1988). One commentator sees the cur-
rent focus on express or implied statutory exceptions to sec. 1738 as misplaced, and
would assign a greater role in the process to federal common law. Burbank, "In-
terjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal Common Law: A
General Approach," 71 Cornell L. Rev. 733 830 (1986).
15. See University of Tennessee v. Elliot, 478 U.S. 788 (1986). The Supreme
Court began by ruling that sec. 1738 did not make state administrative determina-
tions issue-preclusive in federal litigation. The Court then ruled that federal doc-
trine could give the determinations preclusive effect regarding some of plaintiff's
statutory claims, but not plaintiff's claim under Title VII. Concerning the latter,
Congress had not left as much room for the play of federal preclusion doctrine. An
illuminating discussion of this case appears in Silver, "In Lieu of Preclusion:
Recounciling Administrative Decisionmaking and Federal Civil Rights Claims," 65
Ind. L. J. 367 (1990).
16. 111 S. Ct. 2166 (1991).
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of no discrimination did not preclude plaintiff from litigating the
same issue in a federal case brought under the Federal Age Discrim-
ination in Employment Act. State administrative rulings were not
covered by section 1738, stated the Court, and the Age Act provided
an unsuitable environment for supplementing section 1738 with fed-
eral common law.17 On the other hand, the Bankruptcy Code posed
no obstacle to the Court in Grogan v. Gardner.18 It held that prior
fraud adjudications had issue-preclusive effect on fraud dischar-
gability issues in federal bankruptcy proceedings. 19
So far in this decade, there have been fewer concrete develop-
ments on two other fronts: choice of preclusion law for federal di-
versity judgments and for foreign-country judgments. The Supreme
Court has continued to leave open the question whether the effect of
federal diversity judgments is to be measured by state or federal
law, and cases still go both ways.20 Sources of law for determining
the force of foreign-country judgments also remain uncertain.21
17. Refusal to give issue preclusive effect to the state administrative determina-
tion "comports with the broader scheme of the Age Act and the provisions for its
enforcement." 111 S. Ct. at 2172.
18. 111 S. Ct. 654 (1991).
19. "We now clarify that collateral estoppel principles do indeed apply in dis-
charge exception proceedings pursuant to sec. 523(a)." 111 S. Ct. at 658 n.11. Since
the prior fraud adjudications were in federal court, the Court had no occasion to re-
fer to sec. 1738. Presumably, sec. 1738 would function to make fraud adjudications
from state courts as eligible for issue-preclusion treatment. See Markell, 1 Bank-
ruptcy Briefs 4 (Spring, 1991).
20. E.g., compare American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Gen. Hoist Corp., 59 U.S.L.W.
2648 (U.S. Ct. Ap. 10th Cir. 1991), Phoenix Canada Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 749 F.
Supp. 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (favoring federal doctrine with Lane v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d
1247 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. den. 111 S. Ct. 134 (1991); Treepanier v. Getting Oragnized,
Inc., 583 A.2d 583 (Vt. 1990) (favoring state doctrine).
21. Tepley & Whitten, supra n.13, at 718-719. Cf. G. Born & D. Westin, Interna-
tional Civil Litigation in United States Courts 564 (1989) ("There is presently no
uniform national standard governing the enforcement of judgments rendered by for-
eign courts in the Untied States."). See generally Brand, "Enforcement of Foreign-
Money Judgments in the United States: In Search of Uniformity and International
Acceptance," 67 Notre Dame L. Rev. 253 (1991).
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